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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of international capital flows on asset prices through risk 
premia. We investigate whether foreign purchases of U.S. Treasury securities 
significantly contributed to the decline in excess returns on long-term bonds between 
1995 and 2008. We run forecasting regressions of realized excess returns on measures of 
net purchases of treasuries by both foreign official and private agents. We find a clear 
distinction in the effects of flows on excess returns. Official flows, with a negative and 
non-linear effect, appear similar to relative supply shocks; private net purchases, with a 
positive and linear effect, resemble flows that absorb excess supply and are thus 
compensated in equilibrium for this service, similar to the role of arbitrageurs in 
preferred-habitat models of the term structure. 
JEL classification: G110, G120, G150, F310, F320, F340, C220 
Bank classification: Financial markets 
Résumé 
L’auteur étudie l’incidence des flux internationaux de capitaux sur les prix des actifs sous 
l’angle des primes de risque. Son objectif est de déterminer si les achats étrangers de 
titres du Trésor américain ont contribué de façon importante à la baisse des excédents de 
rendement des obligations à long terme observée entre 1995 et 2008. L’auteur a recours à 
des analyses de régression pour établir si des mesures des achats nets étrangers, d’origine 
officielle ou privée, de titres du Trésor peuvent aider à prévoir les excédents de 
rendement réalisés. Il constate que l’effet des flux de capitaux sur les excédents varie 
nettement selon leur provenance. Les flux officiels ont une incidence négative et non 
linéaire analogue à celle de chocs d’offre relative. À l’opposé, les achats nets privés ont 
un effet positif et linéaire et s’apparentent en cela à des flux qui viennent absorber l’offre 
excédentaire. Ils sont rémunérés à l’équilibre pour ce service, qui rappelle le rôle joué par 
les arbitragistes dans les modèles de structure des taux d’intérêt fondés sur la théorie de 
l’habitat préféré. 
Classification JEL : G110, G120, G150, F310, F320, F340, C220 
Classification de la Banque : Marchés financiers 
 
 1 Introduction
Recently, the high level of foreign exchange reserves by oil and commodity exporting coun-
tries, as well as some industrialized countries, has attracted the attention of both the ﬁnancial
press and the academic literature. Speciﬁcally, interest centers on the possible impact that
purchases of long-term U.S. Treasury securities might have on their yields. For example,
it has been suggested that foreign central bank purchases of long-term bonds have been an
important factor contributing to the recent “low” level of long term yields.
The question of whether foreign capital ﬂows impact U.S. interest rates is an important
one because of its implications. From an academic and practitioner standpoint, if it is found
that capital ﬂows can be considered exogenous and impact prices signiﬁcantly, then they
must be included as additional factors in general equilibrium models of the term-structure.
From a policy perspective, the same ﬁnding would imply that prices can be manipulated by
altering relative asset supplies, and this would give an additional channel for policymakers
to inﬂuence long-term rates.
In this paper, we measure the impact of international capital ﬂows on the prices of long-
term U.S. Treasury securities. Although other studies have looked at this issue, they focus
on the impact of measures of capital ﬂows on yield levels or changes. This introduces the
additional complication of controlling for real growth and inﬂation expectations, which are
both unobservable. We take a diﬀerent approach: we note that if capital ﬂows have any eﬀect
on yields by changing relative asset supplies, it must be through excess returns because short-
term interest rates are in control of the monetary authority, which arguably does not set its
main policy rate in response to foreign net purchases and sales of bonds. In addition, given
that prices and quantities are determined simultaneously in equilibrium, we acknowledge that
an exogenous component of demand must be obtained to be able to identify the eﬀect.
These two ideas motivate our empirical strategy, which consists of regressing future re-
alized excess returns on instrumented foreign net purchases of U.S. treasuries. The latter is
deﬁned as a component of net purchases that is perfectly correlated with factors that shift
the demand curve for treasuries. Importantly, in the forecasting regressions, we also control
for other factors that have been previously found to predict excess returns, such as linear
combinations of forward rates and principal components of macroeconomic variables.
The main results can be summarized as follows. When we use the instrumented data on
ﬂows to measure their impact on expected excess returns, we ﬁnd a clear distinction in the
eﬀect of foreign oﬃcial and private ﬂows on excess returns; that is, the impact of capital
ﬂows on excess returns depends on the type of foreign entity. Oﬃcial ﬂows, with a negative
and non-linear eﬀect, appear similar to relative supply shocks that decrease the amount of
bonds available, drive up their prices and thus decrease yields through the component related
to excess returns. Private net purchases, with a positive and linear eﬀect, resemble ﬂows
that absorb excess supply and are thus compensated in equilibrium for this service, similar
to the role of (mean-variance) arbitrageurs in the preferred-habitat model of Vayanos and
Vila (2009). Or, alternatively, foreign private agents appear as being able to systematically
position themselves to exploit low-frequency movements in excess returns. Interestingly, we
do not ﬁnd strong support for the view that international capital ﬂows where among the
main drivers in the decrease in the 10-year yield between 1994 and 2007.
We also show that using benchmark-survey consistent data on holdings will result in an
2inaccurate picture of the impact of foreign purchases on prices. The reason for this is that the
numerical procedure commonly used to make accumulated ﬂows consistent with the survey
data on the level of holdings uses market prices to make valuation adjustments. Thus, any
time we regress market prices on adjusted holdings data, a seemingly signiﬁcant correlation
coeﬃcient will be found, even when the pure ﬂow component of holdings can be weakly or
even not correlated with price changes at all. Because of this, we choose not to use this data
in our tests.
1.1 Related literature
To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to look at excess returns when trying to measure the
impact of capital ﬂows on interest rates. Other studies have looked instead at the eﬀect of
foreigner’s accumulation of U.S. treasuries on their yields. Bernanke et al. (2004) perform
an event-study in which they regress yield changes over a 3-day event window on the dollar
volume (billions) of Japan’s Ministry of Finance foreign exchange interventions. They ﬁnd
that on days in which there were no major economic news, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield
decreased by about 0.66bp per $1 billion. This way of identifying exogenous shocks is close
to ideal, and the eﬀect they ﬁnd is indeed negative, but small1.
Another related paper is Warnock and Warnock (2009). They quantify the impact of
increases in holdings on yields, using both a linear regression framework and a vector error-
correction model. Using benchmark-consistent data on 12-month ﬂows, and including vari-
ables designed to proxy for real and inﬂation expectations, as well as risk premia, they ﬁnd
a negative regression coeﬃcient on accumulated net purchases using restricted least squares.
They also ﬁnd a negative cointegrating vector parameter, as well as a negative short-run
coeﬃcient. The main diﬀerences with the present paper are that we focus on risk premia
instead of yield levels, and that to measure the eﬀect we use an instrumented measure of
foreign purchases to proxy for exogenous innovations in demand, instead of the raw data.
Rudebusch et al. (2006) regress macro-ﬁnance model residuals2 on explanatory variables,
one of which is the scaled trailing 12-month total foreign oﬃcial purchases. Interestingly, they
also ﬁnd a positive relationship between net purchases and yields, as we do. But, as Detken
(2006) points out, they use the data on custodial holdings of foreign oﬃcial institutions by
the New York Fed. In our tests, we use the Treasury International Capital System (TIC)
data because it has a broader coverage and, in addition, allows us to analyze private ﬂows3.
1To put these ﬁgures into perspective, during the Jan2000-Mar2004 period (the Bernanke et al. (2004)
sample), the mean and standard deviation of daily changes in the 10-year yield were -0.25 and 6.35 basis
points, respectively. Therefore, a -0.66 basis point decrease is not even 1-standard deviation away from the
mean. On the other hand, the average monthly net purchases of long-term U.S. Treasury bonds and notes by
foreign oﬃcial institutions during the Jan2000-Mar2004 period was 3.65 billion, with a standard deviation of
8.82 Billion. If we assume i.i.d random variables and 30-day month, we get an approximate daily average net
purchase of 0.122 billion with a standard deviation of 1.61 billion. So a 1 billion intervention is well within a
one standard error conﬁdence interval. Of course, we must always bear in mind that the net purchases data
is nominal, noisy and heteroscedastic. See http://www.treas.gov/tic/tressect.txt
2From both the Bernanke et al. (2004) and Rudebusch and Wu (2008) speciﬁcations.
3See http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/faq2.shtml#q10
32 Theoretical framework
The price of an n-period nominal discount bond at time t is given by the ﬁrst order condition














t is the price of the bond in units of currency. M
$
t+1 = Mt+1 · (1/Πt+1) is the nomi-
nal stochastic discount factor; Mt+1 is the real stochastic discount factor that prices payoﬀs
denominated in units of consumption, and Πt+1 is the one-period gross inﬂation rate, repre-
sented as the growth rate in an index of consumer prices. Let lowercase letters denote the
natural logarithm of their uppercase counterparts, as in xt ≡ lnXt, and deﬁne the log yield
on the n-period bond as y
(n)
t = − 1
np
(n)
t . Then, if we assume that the conditional distribution
of the nominal discount factor and bond prices is joint lognormal, we can express the log-price



























t+1). From this equation,
we can derive several equivalent statements about yields and excess returns. Let t denote a
year. Deﬁne the expected excess return on an n-year bond as the expected return in excess













































This equation deﬁnes the expected excess return or risk premium. It is composed of the
expected one-year ahead volatility of the (n − 1)-year bond price, and the covariance of the
log nominal pricing kernel with the (n − 1)-year bond price at time t + 1. Alternatively, we























As can be seen, foreign capital ﬂows can aﬀect interest rates through their eﬀect on one
or all of the following components of yields: the current one-year rate y
(1)
t ; the expected
future (n − 1)-period rate Et(y
(n−1)







multi-period version of (3) obtains if we substitute recursively for Et(y
(n−1)
t+1 ). It states that
the n-period yield is the average of future expected one-year rates, plus the average of future





























4Equation (4) is the well-known decomposition of yields into expected future short-rates and
excess returns that appears, for example, in Ludvigson and Ng (2009) and Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2008). The equation says that capital ﬂows can aﬀect interest rates if they aﬀect
the whole future path of one-period rates during the life of the bond, or if they aﬀect the
term-structure of risk premia. Since we can view a 1-year bond as a 4-quarter bond, we can
use the same decomposition and eventually obtain that yields are averages of expected future
short-rates, like the 3 month yield, and the average of expected future excess returns, over
smaller time periods4.
Since the 3-month yield is eﬀectively linked to the policy rate which is under the control
of the monetary authorities, we are left with the conclusion that if capital ﬂows have any
eﬀect on yields, it must be through their eﬀect on excess returns5. Indeed, as Cochrane
and Piazzesi (2008) state, citing a speech by Fed Chairman Bernanke6: “... stories about
“demands” by various agents are the same thing as a risk premium”. Thus, in this paper,
we focus on the impact of capital ﬂows on risk-premia.
2.1 Empirical model
In the empirical tests that follow, we assume rational expectations and then regress realized
excess returns at time t + 1 on time t measures of capital ﬂows ft and control variables xt:
rx
(n)
t+1 = α + β
′xt + γ
′ft + et+1
The controls in xt are variables that have been found to have predictive power for future bond
excess returns, while ft contains measures of both foreign oﬃcial and private net purchases
of long-term U.S. Treasury securities.
3 Data
In this section we explain the construction of the series used in this paper and our choice of
sample period.
3.1 Capital ﬂows
Our measures of foreign capital ﬂows into the U.S. Treasury market are the net purchases of
long-term U.S. Treasury securities by both foreign oﬃcial and private agents, shown in Figure
1. These series are available at a monthly frequency from the Treasury International Capital
System (TIC) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury7. In the regressions, we normalize the
4Appendix A presents an example of this point using the 10-year bond, with each time period representing
a quarter, over a 4-quarter holding period.
5Unless one is willing to entertain the possibility that the Fed’s policy actions react to capital ﬂows, in
which case capital ﬂows could also aﬀect expected future short rates. A possibility that seems less extreme
is that the U.S. Treasury issuance decision reacts in some way to expected capital ﬂows (demand). We do
not investigate this issue here.
6Remarks by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke before the Economic Club of New York, New York, New York,
New York, March 20, 2006.
7Available at www.treas.gov/tic/



























Figure 1: Foreign Net Purchases of long-term U.S. Treasury securities as a percentage of
outstanding notes and bonds. Jan1979-Jul2009.
net purchases series by the total amount outstanding (book value) of U.S. Treasury Notes
and Bonds, obtained from the Monthly Statement of the Public Debt, for all months from
December 1978 to July 2007. In section 5, we explain why we choose not to use data on the
level of holdings to perform our tests.
To get a sense of what types of maturities do foreign agents hold, Table 1 presents data
on the maturity structure of foreign holdings of long-term U.S. Treasury securities. As can be
seen, while oﬃcial institutions concentrate their holdings in 1-6 year maturity range, private
agents hold comparatively more long-term (6-10 year) bonds. Indeed, as stated in the June
2008 Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities: “Foreign oﬃcial holdings have
a much shorter average maturity than do foreign private holdings (deﬁned as total holdings
less oﬃcial holdings)”.
Hence, one could expect that if there is any relative-supply induced eﬀect on yields due to
capital ﬂows, they should be localized around the maturities these agents (oﬃcial or private)
hold the most. Therefore, we expect that if foreign oﬃcial ﬂows have any eﬀect on risk
premiums, it should be on the excess returns of bonds of maturities shorter than, say, 6
years. On the other hand, we expect private ﬂows to aﬀect premia on bonds of maturities
longer than 6 years. Because of this, we need data on excess returns of bonds of medium
(1-5 year) and long-term (6-10 year) maturities.
3.1.1 Structural break in foreign oﬃcial holdings
Figure 2 shows that there is a structural break in the dynamics of total foreign holdings around
May 1994, which can be speciﬁcally traced to the behavior of foreign oﬃcial holdings. This
break coincides with the change in the Yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate that happened on
February 1994. In that month, the exchange rate was increased from 5.82 to 8.72CNY per

























Figure 2: Foreign holdings of long-term U.S. Treasury securities as a percentage of outstand-
ing notes and bonds. Dec1984-Jun2008.
USD, which is about a 49% devaluation. Three months after this policy change, its eﬀects
are clearly reﬂected in the increase in foreign oﬃcial reserves. Because of this structural
break, it is natural to expect that the eﬀect of ﬂows on prices, if any, should be stronger in
the post-1994 sample. Hence, we concentrate on the May1994-Dec2008 period when we run
the forecasting regressions.
3.2 Excess-returns
We use two datasets to construct excess returns. One is the Fama Bliss dataset that includes
bonds of maturities from 1 to 5 years. Its main advantage is that it allows a direct comparison
of our results with other studies. Its only disadvantage is the speciﬁc maturities it includes.
We need data on excess returns of maturities longer than 5 years because, as mentioned before,
the data on foreign holdings shows that foreign private agents hold a signiﬁcant amount of
long maturity bonds. To be able to study excess returns on bonds of longer maturities, we
use the Gurkaynak et al. (2006) (GSW) dataset. This gives us monthly observations on prices
of artiﬁcial zero-coupon securities of maturities from 6 to 10 years. From prices, we obtain
forward rates and excess returns.
3.3 Control variables
There is ample evidence that risk premia in the term structure are time-varying. For example,
Fama and Bliss (1987) ﬁnd that the n-year forward spread forecasts excess returns on the
n-year bond. Campbell and Shiller (1991) ﬁnd that the n-year yield spread forecasts the
7change in yield of the n-year bond is excess of the one-year yield, with a coeﬃcient that is
signiﬁcantly less than 1, and negative for most maturities. Stambaugh (1988) ﬁnds, after
controlling for measurement error, that the 4 and 5-month forward premiums predict excess
returns on bonds of maturities up to 6 months8. More recently, Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005) (CP) found that the same linear combination of 2-5 year forward rates forecasts
excess returns on bonds of maturities from 2 to 5 years. In addition, their factor drives out
yield or forward spreads in regressions in which both variables are present. Thus, given that
previous research has identiﬁed variables that predict excess returns, in order to measure
the marginal forecasting power of any additional variable, like foreign capital ﬂows, we must
ﬁrst control for the information content in variables that are already known to predict excess
returns.
The three control variables employed in this paper, to be explained in the next sections,
include two factors that have been previously identiﬁed in the literature as containing useful
information in forecasting excess bond returns, and a new variable that is speciﬁcally designed
to summarize the information about expected excess returns on long-term bonds.
3.3.1 Medium-term forward rates
Following CP, the ﬁrst control variable we use, cp9407t is a factor constructed as the ﬁtted
value in a forecasting regression of average (across the 2 to 5 year maturity range) realized
excess return at time t + 12 on time t forward rates, but using data from May1994-Dec2007
for forward rates, and May1995-Dec2008 for excess returns. In these regressions, we use the
Fama-Bliss dataset.
3.3.2 Principal components of macroeconomic variables
Ludvigson and Ng (2009)(LN) ﬁnd that principal components of macroeconomic indices
have signiﬁcant forecasting power for excess returns, and that the information they contain
is diﬀerent than that in the CP factor. The second control variable we employ, ln9407t is a
factor constructed as the ﬁtted value in a forecasting regression of average (across the 2 to
5 year maturity range) realized excess return at time t + 12 on time t principal components










Hence, if the forward spread forecasts realized excess returns, risk-premia are time-varying. Likewise, the
tests in Campbell and Shiller (1991) derive from a manipulation of (3) that looks like:
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an equation can be derived from (3) that relates n-period bond excess returns to initial forward rates of at
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8of macro variables, as in LN, but using data from May1994-Dec2007 for the macro factors,
and May1995-Dec2008 for the average excess return. In these regressions, we again use the
Fama-Bliss dataset.
3.3.3 Longer-term forward rates
Together, the CP and LN factors have been found to have substantial predictive power for
excess returns, and can be used as a benchmark to measure the forecasting power of other
regressors. Both contain, by construction, information useful in predicting excess returns on
bonds of maturities from 2 to 5 years. However, given that foreign agents hold a signiﬁcant
amount of their treasury portfolio in longer-term maturity bonds, i.e. greater than 5 years,
it is also necessary to include a factor that summarizes information about excess returns
on long-maturity (6-10 years) bonds9. To obtain such a variable, we follow an approach
similar to Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and construct a third control variable, gsw9407t,
as the ﬁtted value in a forecasting regression of average (across the 6 to 10 year maturity
range) realized excess return at time t+ 12 on time t forward rates of maturities of 6, 8 and
10 years10, using data from May1994-Dec2007 for forward rates, and May1995-Dec2008 for
excess returns. In the construction of this factor, we use the Gurkaynak et al. (2006) dataset.
In addition, given that this factor will be correlated with cp9407t, in the tests in the paper
we use   gsw9407t, the orthogonalized gsw factor obtained as the residual in a regression of
gsw9407t on a constant and cp9407t.
3.3.4 The gsw9407t factor and stock returns
If   gsw9407t is indeed related to risk premia, it should also forecast excess stock returns, in
the same way that the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) factor forecasts excess stock returns in
the presence of the dividend yield or term spread11. Table 2 presents forecasting regressions
in which the 3, 6 and 12 month excess return on the CRSP Value-weighted index is regressed
on   gsw9407t, d/p and term. In these regressions, d/p is the natural log of the dividend
yield (all ﬁrms continuously listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ) from Boudoukh et al.
(2007), and downloaded from Michael R. Robert’s website, while term, the term spread, is
the diﬀerence between the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate and the 3-month Treasury
Bill Secondary Market rate. As can be seen, for the period May1994-December2007 in which
the independent variables are measured, the gsw factor predicts stock returns, and with a
9Indeed, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) suggest that long-term forwards might contain additional useful
information. On pp. 15 they write: “We do not get to learn how longer maturity forward rates might
enter into the return-forecasting function, i.e. how the tent-shape pattern across the ﬁrst ﬁve forward rates
is modiﬁed by or extended to longer maturities, but it is clear from Table 1 that there are not enough
degrees of freedom left in the GSW data for us to do that”. As we will explain later, we try to overcome
the multicollinearity problem by excluding adjacent forward rates, and creating the gsw factor by regressing
only long-term gsw returns on long-term gsw forwards only, without including FB data. In a second step, we
orthogonalize the gsw factor with respect to the cp factor, and in this way we can be sure that whatever is
left is not-related to the information in risk premia already contained in the cp factor.
10We use only 3 forward rates as right-hand side variables because all the 6,7,8,9, and 10 year forward rates
are very highly correlated. We hope that excluding the 7 and 9 year forwards helps to mitigate somehow the
multicollinearity problem in the forecasting regressions.
11See Table 3 in their paper
9statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Thus, it is indeed related to compensation for bearing
risk.
Finally, in an appendix available upon request, we present a series of results that show
that this “gsw” factor constructed using long-term forward rates from the GSW dataset has
predictive power for excess bond returns, and that this forecasting power is weak in the pre-
1979 sample, stronger in the post-1979 sample, and strongest after 1994. An explanation for
this is that the regime change in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy changed the information
content in long-term forward rates. In sum, we believe the gsw factor is a legitimate control
variable to include in the regressions using capital ﬂows.
4 Un-instrumented net purchases and excess bond re-
turns
In this section, we present the results of a series of regressions that investigate the eﬀect of
foreign oﬃcial and private ﬂows on excess returns. We ﬁrst discuss the evidence when the
raw normalized foreign ﬂows data are employed in the regressions. Then, in the next section,
we explain the strategy that we use to deal with the endogeneity bias, given that here we are
regressing prices on quantities.
4.1 Regression results
Table 3 presents the results of forecasting regressions of one-year ahead excess returns on
time t control variables and measures of both foreign oﬃcial (foi) and private (priv) capital
ﬂows into long-term U.S. Treasury securities. Notice that oﬃcial ﬂows enter nonlinearly,
while private ﬂows enter linearly in the regressions. Before we discuss the estimation results
below, we brieﬂy explain why this is done.
The rationale for considering non-linear eﬀects is as follows. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2010) show that a signiﬁcant component of the corporate spread that is unrelated
to default risk is negatively correlated with the stock of U.S. Treasury debt outstanding. They
explain this ﬁnding by arguing that the negative correlation between the corporate spread
and the stock of U.S. Treasury debt outstanding reﬂects a demand for “convenience” services
that is unique to U.S. Treasury bonds. They illustrate this idea in a simple representative
agent economy by including real bond holdings in the utility function. Then, an implication
of the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal bond holdings in that model is that a nonlinear
function of the holdings of debt is related to future excess returns. Because of this, we ﬁrst
ran regressions in which both oﬃcial and private ﬂows enter linearly or nonlinearly. The
results of this exercise appear in Table 4, and the main conclusion from that table is that
the eﬀect of oﬃcial ﬂows seems to be greater and estimated with more precision when they
are included in non-linear form, while the opposite holds for private ﬂows. Thus, we chose
to include squared oﬃcial ﬂows together with linear private ﬂows. And, as will be seen later,
this same pattern arises when we employ instrumental variables methods to measure the
impact of exogenous ﬂows on excess returns.
The estimates in Table 3 suggest that the relationship between oﬃcial ﬂows and excess
returns is diﬀerent than that of private ﬂows. The estimated coeﬃcients in the column
10labeled foi
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t (oﬃcial ﬂows squared) are all negative but only the ﬁrst two, which correspond
to the two and three year bonds, are marginally signiﬁcant. On the other hand, for all bonds
of maturities greater than two years, the estimated coeﬃcients in the column labeled privt
(private ﬂows) are positive and signiﬁcant. For private ﬂows, the magnitude of the estimated
coeﬃcients increases monotonically with maturity, while for oﬃcial ﬂows the correlations
increase with maturity, reach a peak, and then decay. The fact that the strongest correlation
for oﬃcial ﬂows is concentrated in the 2-5 year maturity range while that of private ﬂows on
the 6-10 year range is consistent with the evidence in Table 1 that oﬃcial institutions hold
most of their treasury portfolio in medium-term (between 0 and 6 years) securities, while
private agents hold comparatively more long-term (6year+) bonds.
In sum, until now, the evidence suggests that oﬃcial ﬂows have a negative and nonlinear
impact on excess returns, while private ﬂows have a positive and linear eﬀect. At this stage,
however, we must be careful in interpreting these results (we do provide an interpretation in
section 6). As mentioned before, here we are regressing prices on quantities, and in this case,
it is possible12 that an endogeneity bias is present and the coeﬃcient estimates are biased.
Because of this, in the next section we use an alternative approach to better measure the
impact of exogenous changes in demand on prices.
5 Identiﬁcation
It is possible that the regressions in Table 3 underestimate the eﬀect of foreign net purchases
on yields, as both variables are endogenous in equilibrium. Moreover, in general, to be able
to determine a causal eﬀect, we need to identify a component or innovation to net purchases
that is exogenous to changes in supply.
In order to obtain such an exogenous component, we use Instrumental Variables(IV) in
its two-stage least squares (2SLS) version. In the ﬁrst step, we regress net purchases on
lagged values of variables that are thought to inﬂuence capital ﬂows and that are presumably
exogenous to time t’s changes in supply (primary or secondary). The ﬁtted values of these
regressions then become our measure of the exogenous component of demand. In the second
step, we regress future realized excess returns on these ﬁtted values, which we now call
“instrumented” net purchases. The rationale for this is that at least part of the net amount
purchased in any given month depends on variables that can be considered exogenous, either
because they are inﬂuenced by other factors unrelated to the U.S. economy, or measure the
return on a substitute asset, or simply because they occur in the past. Then, changes over
time in these variables should (slowly) shift the net foreign demand curve for treasuries in
such a way that the resulting changes in the quantity demanded are unrelated to time t’s
shocks to the available supply (either new auctions or secondary market)
12We say “possible” because the estimated parameter will be a weighted average of demand and supply
elasticities, were the weights are given by the relative volatilities of the supply and demand shifters. It is
always possible that one volatility dominates the other, in which case the estimate can be “close” to the true
parameter.
115.1 Approximate country attribution of net purchases
Although, in general, the international asset allocation strategies of both foreign oﬃcial and
private institutions, is diﬃcult to determine13, we can gain some insight into the variables that
might be driving ﬂows into the U.S. Treasury market by analyzing their approximate country
attribution. Table 5 presents parameter estimates in regressions that explain aggregate oﬃcial
and private net purchases using individual country net purchase data. The regressions only
report those countries for which the estimated coeﬃcient was signiﬁcant in a ﬁrst-stage
regression in which all countries were included.
As can be seen, the top ﬁve countries whose ﬂows correlate the most with aggregate
oﬃcial ﬂows are Japan, Norway, China, Oil Exporters and Brazil. Except for Norway and
Brazil (important commodity exporters), the appearance of Japan, China and Oil-exporting
countries is hardly surprising, given the size of their foreign exchange reserves (Japan), or the
importance of both their reserves and Sovereign Wealth Funds (China and Oil Exporters,
as well as Norway). Thus, the country attribution results seem to suggest that foreign
exchange reserves management, and diversiﬁcation of investments, but in the narrow asset
class typically employed by central banks (like sovereign bonds), might be important factors
driving oﬃcial ﬂows into long-term U.S. Treasury notes.
On the other hand, we can see that the top ﬁve “countries” whose ﬂows correlate the
most with aggregate private ﬂows are the U.K., Caribbean Banking Centers, Japan, Canada
and the Netherlands. That Japan, the U.K. and Caribbean are indicated by the data as
important sources of private ﬂows into the U.S. Treasury market is not surprising, given that
they are major ﬁnancial centers, and in the case of Japan, important exporters. In addition,
notice that out of the 13 countries that explain private ﬂows, 6 belong to the euro area: the
Netherlands, France, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany. This evidence suggests
that, at a minimum, the performance over time of the CAD, JPY, EUR and GBP against
the US dollar might be an important driver of ﬂows.
5.1.1 Financial center reporting bias
In the next section, we will present our choice of instruments based in part on the infor-
mation given by the regression evidence on the country attribution of oﬃcial and private
net purchases. But before proceeding, some caution must be exerted in interpreting such
evidence. The TIC data possesses a well known limitation14 that must be considered. As
explained in Griever et al. (2001) and Bertaut et al. (2006), the data features a “ﬁnancial
center reporting bias” or “custodial bias”: a large amount of holdings or net purchases is
attributed to countries that are major custodial, investment management or security deposi-
tory centers, like the UK or Cayman Islands. This has two implications: the level of holdings
and net purchases by oﬃcial institutions are probably under-estimated, and private ﬂows
and holdings attributed to the U.K. or Caribbean are not really “native” to these countries,
in the sense that they do not correspond to excess national savings. Nevertheless, as long
as the investment decisions respond to variables that would be deemed important for any
international investor in any country we can guide our choice of instrumental variables at
13Specially, given their size and aggregation.
14Because the system follows Balance of Payments conventions.
12least in part by analyzing with which countries does the aggregate ﬂow data correlate the
most. For example, even if the money is not from UK residents, if the investment decisions
are made by UK-based investment management ﬁrms that take into consideration, say, the
USD/GBP exchange rate, then it is reasonable to think that ﬂows from the UK to the US
will respond to exchange rate movements.
5.2 Instruments for oﬃcial ﬂows
In their study of the determinants of the corporate spread, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2010) point out that the surety and neutrality motives are important considera-
tions for oﬃcial holders of U.S. Treasury notes. This suggests that sovereign, supranational
and government agency bonds, not necessarily from the U.S. government or even dollar de-
nominated, could be a preferred asset class to corporate bonds when these agents consider
diversifying their portfolios. This is because these obligations also carry an implicit or ex-
plicit federal or state government guarantee15, and in this sense, they might be the closest
“substitutes” to U.S. treasuries16. Motivated by this idea, we include as instrumental vari-
ables for oﬃcial ﬂows the yield spreads on bonds that are either denominated in U.S. dollars
and are not issued by the U.S. Treasury but carry an explicit government guarantee, or that
are denominated in foreign currency but are issued by their respective ﬁscal authorities and
are thus guaranteed by the government.
As an example of the ﬁrst type of asset, we use the government-related yield spread,
which is the diﬀerence between the redemption yield of the Barclays Capital Government-
Related Index and the average of the 1, 3 and 5 year Treasury Constant Maturity rates.
The asset classes that are included in the government-related index are agency17, sovereign,
supranational and local authority bonds (SSA bonds). As representatives of the second
category, we include the bund-spreads, which are the diﬀerence between the yield to maturity
of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch German Federal Governments 5-10 Yrs and 10+Yrs
indices (in local currency), respectively, and the yield to maturity on the U.S. Treasuries 5-10
Yrs and 10+Yrs indices, respectively.
In Figure 3, we plot the yield spreads used as instruments for oﬃcial net purchases, as well
as the corporate spread. As can be inferred from the size of the spread relative to treasuries,
the bonds included in the government-related index are closer to being “substitutes’ for
treasuries than corporate bonds, as the spreads are closer to zero and smaller than the
corporate spread for most of the sample. And this should come as no surprise, given the
explicit government guarantee.
In addition to yield spreads, we also consider foreign exchange intervention operations as
a possible driver of ﬂows into long-term U.S. Treasury Bonds. Notice that in Panel A of Table
5, Japan is one of the countries whose net purchases correlate the most with aggregate oﬃcial
15For example, while the obligations of The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) are not guaranteed by any speciﬁc government, they are backed by the pool of capital commit-
ments of its member countries. On the other hand, the bonds of Spain’s Instituto de Cr´ edito Oﬁcial (ICO),
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), or Germany’s Kreditanstalt f¨ ur Wiederaufbau (KFW) are
government-guaranteed.
16I thank Grahamne Johnsonn for pointing this out.
17Both native and non-native currency agency bonds are included. Native currency issues include Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Bank




























Figure 3: Government-related, bund and corporate yield spreads. May1994-Dec2007.
ﬂows. Indeed, in part as a result of a policy that aims to keep the exchange rate competitive
in order to boost exports, Japan has accumulated vast foreign exchange reserves and, in the
past, foreign exchange interventions have been common. If the intervention operations are
large, occur during consecutive months and at least part of them involve buying and selling
U.S. Treasuries, it is natural to expect that FX interventions might explain or even forecast
oﬃcial ﬂows into the U.S. Treasury market. Thus, we include Japan’s Ministry of Finance
interventions as an additional forecasting variable for oﬃcial ﬂows. Finally, to proxy for
short-term ﬂows sensitive to short-term stock market trends, we also include the returns on
the S&P 500 index as a forecasting variable.
5.2.1 First-stage results: instrumental variables
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of regressing foreign oﬃcial net purchases on lagged
values of all the instruments. The empirical model with lagged variables can explain close to
a third of the variation in oﬃcial net purchases. Most of the coeﬃcients have the correct sign:
for example, since the government-related and the ﬁve-ten year bund spreads represent the
return on “substitute” goods, we expect them to have a negative sign, as they would lead to a
portfolio reallocation away from U.S. treasuries. Also, Japan’s Ministry of Finance interven-
tions, which correspond to a purchase of foreign currency against the yen, are estimated to
have a positive eﬀect on net purchases. Interestingly, the ten-plus bund spread is estimated
to have a positive eﬀect on oﬃcial ﬂows, instead of negative as we had hypothesized. This
14points to the possibility that, conditional on the value of the ﬁve-ten year bund spread, in
the short-run long-term German bonds might instead be “complements” to long-term U.S.
Treasuries. Finally, the past return on the S&P 500 Index forecasts positive ﬂows into long-
term U.S. Treasury bonds, and this can be explained if oﬃcial agents purchase bonds when
their price has temporarily decreased as other (private) investors sell bonds and invest in
stocks after past good stock market returns.
Overall, the results show that the instruments employed capture a substantial portion
of the variation in oﬃcial ﬂows. In addition, the F-statistics for joint signiﬁcance are all
well above 10, which is the threshold suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) when trying to
determine if the instruments are weak. In the next section, we use the ﬁtted values from
this regression as our measure of “instrumented” foreign oﬃcial net purchases to estimate
the impact of exogenous variation in these ﬂows on excess returns.
5.3 Instruments for private ﬂows
As instruments for foreign private ﬂows, we use currency depreciations against the dollar.
The idea here is that foreign private portfolios should respond to past changes in exchange
rates.
Our choice of currencies is in part motivated by the results in Table 5. As mentioned
before, 6 out the 13 countries that explain private ﬂows belong to the euro area. Hence, it
is natural to consider changes in the USD/EUR exchange rate as a possible driver of ﬂows
into the U.S. Treasury market. Also, ﬂows from Japan, Canada and the U.K. also appear to
correlate signiﬁcantly with aggregate private ﬂows: because of this, we also consider changes
in the CAD/USD, JPY/USD and USD/GBP rates. With respect to the other countries in
the table, recall that most of the Caribbean Banking center countries as well as China and
Hong Kong have ﬁxed exchange rates against the U.S. dollar.
Figure 4 plots the instruments for foreign private ﬂows. Except for the USD/EUR rate,
these currency movements will explain low-frequency changes in demand.
5.3.1 First-stage results: instrumental variables
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of regressing foreign private net purchases on lagged
values of all the instruments. The results indicate that long-term appreciation of the Cana-
dian dollar (negative CAD/USD growth rate), short-term appreciation of the euro (pos-
itive USD/EUR growth rate), and long-term appreciation of the British pound (positive
USD/GBP growth rate) all forecast inﬂows into long-term U.S. Treasury notes. While it is
outside of the scope of the present paper to provide a detailed explanation of the portfolio
strategies followed by the foreign private institutions that invest in the long-term US trea-
sury market, we note that from the point of view of foreign investors, past domestic currency
appreciations increase the domestic currency value of their U.S. investments. During 1994-
2008, US treasury bonds had a low CAPM beta18, so it is then conceivable that, faced with
18In a recent study of the risks in nominal U.S. bonds, Campbell et al. (2010) note that between 1994 and
2008 (our sample), the CAPM beta of the 10-year nominal zero-coupon Treasury bond decreased sharply
from a value close to 1 to a negative ﬁgure during most of the 2000-2009 period. Indeed, between May1994




















































































Figure 4: Log-growth rates in nominal exchange rates. May1994-Dec2007.
an increase in their capital, at least some conservative foreign private investors might chose
to rebalance their portfolios and invest more in US bonds.
On the other hand, the results suggest that long-term depreciations of the Japanese Yen
(positive JPY/USD growth rate) are associated with private inﬂows into U.S. bonds. This
can be partially explained if the money obtained from exports as a consequence of benign
currency trends is recycled into U.S. bonds.
Overall, the regression explains close to 24% of the variation in private ﬂows. As before,
the F-statistics for joint signiﬁcance are all well above 10, which is the threshold suggested
by Staiger and Stock (1997) when trying to determine if the instruments are weak. In the
second stage regressions, we use the ﬁtted values from this regression as our measure of
“instrumented” foreign private net purchases.
6 Instrumented net purchases and excess bond returns
In this section, we discuss the main results of the paper. As before, we concentrate on a
speciﬁcation that includes squared oﬃcial ﬂows together with linear private ﬂows. Additional
results in which both ﬂows enter either linearly or nonlinearly are presented in Table 8, which
shows that the main conclusions do not change.
would have been close to hedges against stock market risk.
166.1 In-sample results
Table 7 shows the results of regressing one-year ahead excess returns on time t instrumented
net purchases and controls. The signs of the estimated coeﬃcients are similar to those
obtained using un-instrumented ﬂows, and show a clear distinction in the eﬀect of foreign
oﬃcial and private ﬂows on excess returns. With respect to oﬃcial purchases we see that the
estimated coeﬃcients on c foi
2
t are again all negative, but bigger in magnitude and estimated
with greater precision: all coeﬃcients up to that for the 8-year bond are highly signiﬁcant. For
private ﬂows, the coeﬃcients on d privt are again all positive, but now, as in the case of oﬃcial
ﬂows, larger and estimated with more precision. Thus, the extraction of a component of
ﬂows that is perfectly correlated with past information clearly helps to improve the precision
of the estimates.
Interestingly, the term structure of estimated coeﬃcients diﬀers across types of ﬂows. For
private ﬂows, the coeﬃcients increase monotonically with maturity, as the highest coeﬃcient
is that of the 10-year bond. On the other hand, for oﬃcial ﬂows, the coeﬃcients increase (in
absolute value) with maturity up to the 6 year bond, and then decay; that is, they feature a
hump-shaped pattern. Notice that, in particular, the coeﬃcient for the 10 year bond is not
the highest or even statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, the results do not lend strong support for
the view that international capital ﬂows where among the main drivers in the decrease in the
10-year yield between 1994 and 2007.
Overall, the most important ﬁnding is that the results suggest that the impact of capital
ﬂows on excess returns depends on the type of foreign entity. Oﬃcial ﬂows, with a negative
and non-linear eﬀect, appear similar to relative supply shocks that decrease the amount of
bonds available, drive up their prices and thus decrease yields through the component related
to excess returns. Private net purchases, with a positive and linear eﬀect, resemble ﬂows that
absorb excess supply and are thus compensated in equilibrium for this service, similar to the
role of arbitrageurs in the preferred-habitat model of Vayanos and Vila (2009)19. Or, along
these lines, we can also think of foreign private agents as simply having a mean-variance
objective for their optimal portfolio allocation (both explanations are equivalent). Finally,
it could also be the case that the positive correlation reﬂects the fact that foreign private
agents are able to systematically position themselves to exploit low-frequency movements in
excess returns.
6.2 Out-of-sample tests
In the last section, we showed evidence that foreign oﬃcial and private ﬂows forecast future
excess returns in-sample. In this section, we present the results of out-of-sample forecasting
exercises. In particular, we gauge the forecasting ability of foreign net purchases by calcu-
19In that model, an increase in the relative supply must be absorbed by arbitrageurs and, in equilibrium,
forecasts positive excess returns. This is because arbs are mean-variance optimizers, and the only way they
are willing to take positive positions in bonds is if these promise positive excess returns. Also, because of the
single-factor Vasicek-type structure of the model, risks are perfectly correlated across maturities. This implies
that, in order for arbs to absorb the excess supply of, say, 6-year bonds, the excess returns (compensation)
of all adjacent bonds must also go up, since by accumulating more 6-year bonds, arbs are now exposed to
more short-rate risk, and will try to diversify across maturities. So, in the end, the eﬀect of relative supply
shocks are not concentrated in the maturity in which they occur.
17lating the MSE-ratio criterion, and the forecast encompassing test proposed by Clark and
McCracken (2001).
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 9 present the mean-squared error ratio, and the enc-new
statistic for forecast encompassing, respectively. Each row corresponds to a speciﬁc bond:
for example, the third row presents the results of the out of sample tests when the dependent
variable is the 4-year bond excess return. In general, we see that the conclusions about fore-
casting performance from out-of-sample tests are consistent with the in-sample regressions.
All of the mean-squared error ratios are below one, and the enc-new statistics are much
higher than the 99% critical value when there are two additional regressors to test. In sum,
the out-of-sample test indicates that foreign ﬂows would have helped to improve forecasts of
excess returns.
7 The problem with benchmark-consistent data on hold-
ings
In this paper, we have used data on foreign net purchases to test if they have any impact
on risk premia. It is well known that the TIC data on ﬂows is imperfect, because when
this data is used to obtain the level of holdings, the resulting estimate rarely matches the
ﬁgures reported in the comprehensive (but infrequent) security-level annual benchmark sur-
veys of foreign holdings20. In principle, these two sources can be combined to obtain a better
monthly measure of the level of foreign holdings (and net purchases) of U.S. Treasury securi-
ties. For example, Bertaut and Tryon (2007), extending the methodology originally used in
Thomas et al. (2004) and Warnock and Warnock (2009), construct monthly estimates of U.S.
cross-border securities positions obtained by combining the benchmark surveys with monthly
transactions data. Thus, this new series, which uses the primitive data on net purchases but
performs additional manipulations in order to make it “consistent” with the surveys would
seem to be a better source of information about foreign ﬂows into the U.S. Treasury market.
However, as we show next, the problem with this approach is that the adjusted data will
then mix the eﬀects of market prices on capital ﬂows, and this can create a spurious strong
negative relationship between ﬂows and yields.
20Although this is mostly true for the UK, given the ﬁnancial center reporting bias. For other
countries, the discrepancies between ﬂows-based estimates of holdings and reported holdings are
small. See, for example, the document “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities”, available at
http://www.treas.gov/tic/mfhhis01.txt. Indeed, the reporting error is small for the major holders of treasury
debt: China and Japan. For example, as of June 2008, the ﬂows-based estimate of holdings for China was
503.8 billion, while the survey ﬁgure was 535.1 billion; this represents a reporting error of (535.1-503.8)/503.8
= 0.0621, or 6%. For Japan, the reporting error is (628.0-580.4)/580.4 = 0.0820, or 8%. On the other hand,
for the U.K. the reporting error is (279.1-55.0)/55.0 = 4.0745, or 407%. Thus, if the goal is to study the
importance of ﬂows across countries, the net purchase data can give an incomplete picture. But if the goal
is to study broad aggregates, and most importantly, their relationship to market prices, the net purchase
data, while still containing reporting errors, is at least free of any additional manipulation that introduces
endogenous noise into the ﬁgures.
18Bertaut and Tryon (2007) construct measures of holdings (positions) ˜ St from data on net
purchases and market prices using the formula21:
















˜ πi,t is the rate of increase in the price of securities from i to t, and ˜ Ni is observed net ﬂows,
both assumed to be observed with error. ε represents measurement error in security prices,
while β is measurement error in the ﬂows data, as well as transaction costs. ˜ GT = ST − ˜ ST,
is the “gap” or diﬀerence between actual and estimated survey positions. Notice that λt, an
adjustment factor, depends on the (future) history of market value adjustments. Given that
holdings are measured in nominal terms, to eliminate concerns about the stationarity of the
data, if we take ﬁrst diﬀerences of (5), we can decompose the change in holdings in 3 parts:
∆˜ St ≡ ˜ St − ˜ St−1 = ˜ St−1ˆ πt | {z } + ˆ Nt |{z} +
λtGT
πt,T | {z }
= valt + ﬂowt + gapt. (6)
That is, the change in estimated holdings comes from either a valuation change, a “pure”
net ﬂow, or an allocation of the ﬁnal gap. To get a sense of how strong is the correlation of
∆˜ St, as well as each component, with ∆y
(10)
t , the ten-year treasury constant maturity rate,
in Table 10 we present such correlations at various leads and lags. As can be seen, changes
in holdings are negatively correlated with changes in interest rates, both contemporaneously
as well as at several leads and lags. But a glance at the last three rows shows where the
correlation is coming from. Most of the contemporaneous (as well as lagged) correlation of
∆˜ St with ∆y
(10)
t comes from the negative correlation that valt has with ∆y
(10)
t . It is because
of this shortcoming in the construction of “benchmark-consistent” ﬂows that we chose to use
the raw net purchase data.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we measure the impact of international capital ﬂows on the prices of long-term
U.S. Treasury securities. We argue that if there is any eﬀect of foreign net purchases of
the prices of long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, it must be through risk-premia because short-
rates are controlled by the Central Bank which does not respond to foreign purchases of
long-term bonds. Hence, our empirical methodology consists of regressing future realized
excess returns on time t measures of oﬃcial and private ﬂows. We address the problem of
endogeneity by extracting a component of net purchases that is perfectly correlated with
lagged instruments, and thus potentially uncorrelated to time t’s shocks in relative supply.
21This is equation (5) in their paper. The description of the variables follows Bertaut and Tryon (2007)
closely.
19The most important ﬁnding is that the results suggest that the inﬂuence of capital ﬂows on
excess returns depends on the type of foreign entity; that is, we ﬁnd a clear distinction in the
nature of the impact of foreign ﬂows on excess returns. Oﬃcial ﬂows, with a negative and
non-linear eﬀect, appear similar to relative supply shocks that decrease the amount of bonds
available, drive up their prices and thus decrease yields through the component related to
excess returns. Private net purchases, with a positive and linear eﬀect, resemble ﬂows that
absorb excess supply and are thus compensated in equilibrium for this service, similar to the
role of arbitrageurs in preferred-habitat models of the term structure. Or, alternatively, we
could think of foreign private agents as having the skill to systematically position themselves
to exploit low-frequency movements in excess returns.
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22Appendices
A Holding period returns
Consider a 10-year nominal discount bond. If each time period is a quarter, then it is a


















































If we perform the same substitution, ﬁrst with p
(38)

































That is, over the next year, the bond “collects” 4 one-period short rates, and 4 excess returns
(which can be positive or negative). Notice that p
(36)
t+4 embeds short-rates and excess returns
that happen after t+4. Therefore, concentrating at a one-year horizon, since short-rates are
controlled by the monetary authority, then any impact of large purchases by foreign agents
must happen through risk premiums.
Notice that (8) uses quarterly sampled data, while in the empirical implementation of the
paper, we use annual yields; i.e., instead of 4 expected future short-rates, we had the 1-year
yield. However, it can be shown that (8) is equivalent to (??), with a slight modiﬁcation of












Again, assuming joint lognormality of the nominal stochastic discount factor and bond prices,












































23Notice there is no term with expected future bond price at time t+4 since the bond matures
in t + 4, and that the bond only collects 3 risk premiums, since at the 4th period, there is
no “excess” return over the 3-month rate. If we solve (10) for the term involving the sum of




































t is exactly the one-year yield. So, if we measure excess returns at
the 1-year horizon, the “risk premium” term is the diﬀerence between excess returns realized
at each quarter between the long bond and the bond of the same maturity as the holding
period. But the same conclusion applies: any eﬀect of capital ﬂows on prices has to be on
risk premiums. It is because of this that we look directly at realized excess returns and relate
them to measures of net purchases, using a particular identiﬁcation strategy, to gauge any
causal eﬀects.
24Table 1: Maturity structure of foreign holdings of long-term U.S. Treasury securities.
This table presents the maturity distribution of foreign holdings of long-term U.S. Treasury securities. As
indicated in the benchmark surveys, in the “time to maturity” column, “1-2” should be read as holdings that
will mature between a year and a day, and two years after June 30 of the survey year. Source: Report on Foreign
Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities, Department of the Treasury, 2002-2008.
Time to Survey year
maturity 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
range (years) Panel A: Total
≤ 1 14.8 14.2 16.3 16.2 16.7 15.7 15.7
1-2 24.5 24.3 20.3 20.6 20.4 21.1 22.4
2-3 8.5 8.0 11.2 12.2 11.8 12.7 8.7
3-4 7.9 7.6 9.5 10.4 10.4 8.7 8.5
4-5 8.6 11.7 12.7 11.1 8.8 8.3 11.1
5-6 5.1 3.3 2.7 2.3 2.4 3.3 5.5
6-7 3.8 3.6 2.7 2.4 3.4 5.3 5.5
7-8 3.6 3.8 2.3 3.7 5.7 5.5 5.3
8-9 4.2 3.5 4.6 6.2 6.1 6.1 5.0
9-10 3.8 6.0 7.7 6.0 6.6 5.3 5.1
10-15 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.4
15-20 4.1 4.5 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.4
≥ 20 8.6 6.7 4.0 3.6 3.0 2.8 2.4
Panel B: oﬃcial
≤ 1 - - 19.6 19.2 18.9 17.4 16.9
1-2 - - 23.7 23.1 22.1 22.7 24.1
2-3 - - 11.7 12.7 12.8 13.6 9.4
3-4 - - 9.3 11.3 11.6 9.5 9.1
4-5 - - 12.8 11.5 8.7 8.3 11.1
5-6 - - 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.9 5.8
6-7 - - 2.9 1.9 3.0 5.6 5.6
7-8 - - 2.0 2.8 6.1 5.5 5.3
8-9 - - 4.1 7.0 5.9 5.9 4.6
9-10 - - 7.3 5.1 5.5 4.5 4.0
10-15 - - 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.8 1.8
15-20 - - 1.4 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.0
≥ 20 - - 1.4 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.2
Panel C: Private
≤ 1 - - 10.7 10.1 11.2 11.0 11.7
1-2 - - 14.5 15.2 16.4 16.2 16.5
2-3 - - 10.3 11.3 9.4 10.0 6.4
3-4 - - 9.8 8.7 7.5 6.4 6.7
4-5 - - 12.5 10.3 8.9 8.2 11.2
5-6 - - 2.6 2.4 2.5 4.5 4.4
6-7 - - 2.5 3.5 4.3 4.6 5.1
7-8 - - 2.9 5.5 4.6 5.4 5.4
8-9 - - 5.5 4.7 6.7 6.6 6.3
9-10 - - 8.5 7.6 9.5 7.6 8.5
10-15 - - 5.8 6.4 4.9 4.9 4.3
15-20 - - 6.0 5.5 5.7 6.3 7.0
≥ 20 - - 8.3 8.8 8.3 8.3 6.5
25Table 2: Forecasts of excess stock returns
This table presents parameter estimates of forecasting regressions of excess returns on the CRSP Value-weighted
stock price index. The dependent variable rx
(vw)
t+k is the realized return on the VW index in excess of the k-month
treasury rate observed in month t. ^ gsw9407t is the residual in a regression of gsw9407t on a constant and cp9407t.
cp9407t is a factor constructed as the ﬁtted value in a forecasting regression of average (across the 2 to 5 year
maturity range) realized excess return at time t+1 on time t forward rates, as in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005),
but using data from May1994-Dec2007 for forward rates, and May1995-Dec2008 for excess returns. gsw9407t is
a factor constructed as the ﬁtted value in a forecasting regression of average (across the 6 to 10 year maturity
range) realized excess return at time t + 1 on time t forward rates of maturities of 6, 8 and 10 years, using data
from May1994-Dec2007 for forward rates, and May1995-Dec2008 for excess returns. d/p is the natural log of
the dividend yield (all ﬁrms continuosly listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ) from Boudoukh et al. (2007),
and downloaded from Michael R. Robert’s website. term, the term spread, is the diﬀerence between the 10-year
Treasury constant maturity rate and the 3-month Treasury Bill Secondary Market rate. Data is sampled at
a monthly frequency, with explanatory variables measured during the period May1994-December2007. Hansen
and Hodrick (1980) AC t-statistics of lag order 3, 6 and 12 are in parentheses. Coeﬃcient estimates that are
signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level or better are highlighted in boldface.
constant ^ gsw9407t d/p term adjR2
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
rx
(vw)
t+3 0.302 -0.863 0.080 0.010 0.242
(1.823) (-3.672) (2.025) (1.403)
rx
(vw)
t+6 0.673 -1.479 0.164 0.014 0.422
(2.412) (-4.035) (2.480) (1.135)
rx
(vw)
t+12 1.204 -2.312 0.280 0.017 0.410
(2.031) (-3.452) (1.984) (0.666)
26Table 3: Excess returns and un-instrumented net purchases: baseline results
This table presents parameter estimates of forecasting regressions of one-year ahead excess returns on lagged
variables. The dependent variable, rx
(n)
t+1 is the realized excess return on an n-year bond, with the speciﬁc
maturity indicated in column 1. In constructing all excess returns and factors, returns for the 2 to 5 year
maturity range are from the Fama-Bliss dataset, while those of the 6 to 10 year maturity range are from the
Gurkaynak et al. (2006) dataset. ln9407t is a factor constructed as the ﬁtted value in a forecasting regression
of average (across the 2 to 5 year maturity range) realized excess return at time t + 1 on time t principal
components of macro variables, as in Ludvigson and Ng (2009), but using data from May1994-Dec2007 for the
macro factors, and May1995-Dec2008 for the average excess return. cp9407t is a factor constructed as the ﬁtted
value in a forecasting regression of average (across the 2 to 5 year maturity range) realized excess return at time
t + 1 on time t forward rates, as in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), but using data from May1994-Dec2007 for
forward rates, and May1995-Dec2008 for excess returns. ^ gsw9407t is the residual in a regression of gsw9407t on
a constant and cp9407t, where gsw9407t is a factor constructed as the ﬁtted value in a forecasting regression
of average (across the 6 to 10 year maturity range) realized excess return at time t + 1 on time t forward rates
of maturities of 6, 8 and 10 years, using data from May1994-Dec2007 for forward rates, and May1995-Dec2008
for excess returns. foit is foreign oﬃcial net purchases of long-term U.S. Treasury securities, normalized by the
total amount outstanding of treasury notes and bonds. privt is foreign private net purchases of long-term U.S.
Treasury securities, normalized by the total amount outstanding of treasury notes and bonds. Data is sampled
at a monthly frequency, with explanatory variables measured during the period May1994-December2007, and
excess returns (dependent variables) during the May1995-December2008 period. Hansen and Hodrick (1980) AC
t-statistics of lag order 12 are in parentheses. Coeﬃcient estimates that are signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence
level or better are highlighted in boldface.
constant ln9407t cp9407t ^ gsw9407t foi2
t privt ¯ R
2 χ2
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) F
Fama-Bliss 2-5yr mat. bonds
rx
(2)
fb,t+1 -0.003 0.294 0.404 0.200 -0.009 0.002 0.668 477.072
(-1.088) (2.946) (4.093) (5.510) (-2.111) (1.294) 95.414
rx
(3)
fb,t+1 -0.005 0.475 0.784 0.411 -0.016 0.006 0.661 319.112
(-0.875) (2.409) (4.020) (5.859) (-1.916) (1.978) 63.822
rx
(4)
fb,t+1 -0.006 0.526 1.068 0.585 -0.020 0.011 0.639 228.076
(-0.688) (1.902) (3.898) (5.946) (-1.695) (2.481) 45.615
rx
(5)
fb,t+1 -0.007 0.464 1.335 0.775 -0.020 0.015 0.636 196.903
(-0.674) (1.360) (3.949) (6.388) (-1.366) (2.886) 39.381
Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright 6-10yr mat. bonds
rx
(6)
gsw,t+1 -0.006 0.369 1.642 0.888 -0.019 0.019 0.615 148.019
(-0.508) (0.921) (4.139) (6.178) (-1.093) (3.005) 29.604
rx
(7)
gsw,t+1 -0.005 0.225 1.901 1.002 -0.016 0.022 0.598 122.091
(-0.374) (0.498) (4.248) (6.122) (-0.852) (3.141) 24.418
rx
(8)
gsw,t+1 -0.004 0.050 2.145 1.097 -0.014 0.025 0.577 105.080
(-0.246) (0.100) (4.322) (5.994) (-0.640) (3.215) 21.016
rx
(9)
gsw,t+1 -0.002 -0.145 2.373 1.177 -0.011 0.028 0.554 96.008
(-0.125) (-0.263) (4.349) (5.803) (-0.459) (3.238) 19.202
rx
(10)
gsw,t+1 -0.000 -0.353 2.584 1.243 -0.008 0.030 0.529 93.152
(-0.011) (-0.586) (4.332) (5.569) (-0.309) (3.227) 18.630
27Table 4: Excess returns and un-instrumented net purchases: alternative speciﬁcations
This table presents parameter estimates of forecasting regressions of one-year ahead excess returns on lagged
variables. It includes alternative speciﬁcations to the main results on Table 3. The variables employed and
their construction are explained in that table. Data is sampled at a monthly frequency, with explanatory
variables measured during the period May1994-December2007, and excess returns (dependent variables) during
the May1995-December2008 period.
constant ln9407t cp9407t ^ gsw9407t foit privt foi2
t priv2
t adjR2 χ2
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) F
Fama-Bliss 2-5yr mat. bonds
-0.003 0.279 0.414 0.199 -0.006 0.002 0.666 365.361
rx
(2)
fb,t+1 (-1.053) (2.819) (4.247) (5.537) (-2.119) (1.039) 73.072
-0.003 0.294 0.403 0.197 -0.009 0.001 0.665 420.161
(-1.035) (2.934) (4.084) (5.401) (-2.039) (1.170) 84.032
-0.005 0.452 0.801 0.408 -0.011 0.005 0.658 292.300
rx
(3)
fb,t+1 (-0.863) (2.298) (4.127) (5.854) (-1.780) (1.731) 58.460
-0.005 0.476 0.778 0.399 -0.015 0.004 0.654 314.355
(-0.771) (2.373) (3.939) (5.602) (-1.789) (1.690) 62.871
-0.006 0.518 1.087 0.584 -0.011 0.010 0.632 242.559
rx
(4)
fb,t+1 (-0.754) (1.861) (3.956) (5.911) (-1.269) (2.222) 48.512
-0.004 0.530 1.049 0.564 -0.018 0.006 0.625 217.132
(-0.507) (1.848) (3.711) (5.536) (-1.506) (1.848) 43.426
-0.008 0.483 1.352 0.777 -0.007 0.014 0.629 250.596
rx
(5)
fb,t+1 (-0.810) (1.403) (3.980) (6.359) (-0.711) (2.644) 50.119
-0.005 0.470 1.305 0.746 -0.018 0.008 0.617 161.326
(-0.448) (1.308) (3.682) (5.833) (-1.148) (2.062) 32.265
GSW 6-10yr mat. bonds
-0.008 0.398 1.656 0.891 -0.006 0.018 0.609 229.028
rx
(6)
gsw,t+1 (-0.652) (0.987) (4.163) (6.160) (-0.459) (2.799) 45.806
-0.003 0.379 1.592 0.852 -0.016 0.009 0.590 116.817
(-0.230) (0.889) (3.787) (5.572) (-0.857) (1.870) 23.363
-0.007 0.276 1.912 1.006 -0.002 0.021 0.593 213.585
rx
(7)
gsw,t+1 (-0.553) (0.608) (4.274) (6.129) (-0.138) (2.965) 42.717
-0.001 0.239 1.835 0.959 -0.013 0.010 0.568 88.719
(-0.064) (0.492) (3.828) (5.462) (-0.608) (1.802) 17.744
-0.007 0.124 2.152 1.104 0.002 0.024 0.575 187.286
rx
(8)
gsw,t+1 (-0.456) (0.248) (4.356) (6.031) (0.148) (3.071) 37.457
0.001 0.068 2.062 1.048 -0.009 0.011 0.545 72.177
(0.085) (0.126) (3.849) (5.306) (-0.396) (1.715) 14.435
-0.006 -0.048 2.375 1.185 0.007 0.027 0.554 155.013
rx
(9)
gsw,t+1 (-0.362) (-0.087) (4.397) (5.871) (0.396) (3.126) 31.003
0.004 -0.123 2.274 1.122 -0.006 0.011 0.519 64.984
(0.219) (-0.205) (3.840) (5.110) (-0.220) (1.620) 12.997
-0.005 -0.231 2.581 1.254 0.011 0.030 0.531 124.961
rx
(10)
gsw,t+1 (-0.271) (-0.389) (4.396) (5.665) (0.609) (3.143) 24.992
0.006 -0.328 2.470 1.182 -0.002 0.011 0.493 63.922
(0.336) (-0.497) (3.804) (4.889) (-0.078) (1.528) 12.784
28Table 5: Approximate country attribution of Net Purchases
This table presents estimated coeﬃcients in regressions of aggregate foreign oﬃcial and private net purchases
of long-term U.S. Treasury securities on individual country net purchases. foit is net purchases by oﬃcial
institutions of all countries, and privt is net purchases by non-oﬃcial institutions of all countries. The individual
country net purchase data represents the sum of both oﬃcial and non-oﬃcial ﬂows for that country and is
standardized to be able to compare the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients across countries. The regressions only
report those countries for which the estimated coeﬃcient was signiﬁcant in a ﬁrst-stage regression is which all
countries were included. Newey and West (1987) HAC t-statistics of lag order 3 are in parentheses.
Panel A: foreign oﬃcial ﬂows: foit Panel B: foreign private ﬂows: privt
country coeﬀ. nw-tstat country coeﬀ nw-tstat
constant 0.154 13.615 constant 0.336 22.252
japan 0.154 8.121 uk 0.342 29.049
norway 0.143 11.083 caribbean 0.315 21.983
china 0.092 5.457 japan 0.136 5.122
oil exporters 0.088 6.225 canada 0.071 3.774
brazil 0.076 6.046 netherlands 0.068 6.053
taiwan 0.068 4.855 china 0.048 2.945
singapore 0.064 7.140 hong kong 0.046 4.166
mexico 0.051 5.648 france 0.045 3.763
germany 0.042 3.036 ireland 0.041 3.146
israel 0.041 3.849 bel-lux 0.039 2.326
turkey 0.039 4.164 germany 0.037 2.531
egypt 0.031 2.365 thailand 0.032 2.596
switz 0.025 2.372 russia 0.026 1.997
philipines -0.027 -2.391
adjR2 0.776 adjR2 0.890
29Table 6: Regressions of foreign net purchases on lagged instruments
This table presents parameter estimates in regressions that forecast foreign net purchases of U.S. Treasuries with
lagged values of instruments. The variables used to forecast foreign oﬃcial net purchases, foit, are as follows.
The government-related yield spread, govt-relatedt−3, is the diﬀerence between the redemption yield (in USD)
of the Barclays Capital Government-Related Index and the average of the 1, 3 and 5 year Treasury Constant




t−1 , are the diﬀerence between the
yield to maturity of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch German Federal Governments 5-10 Yrs and 10+Yrs
indices (in local currency), respectively, and the yield to maturity on the U.S. Treasuries 5-10 Yrs and 10+Yrs
indices, respectively. The U.S. dollar volume (in billions) of Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) interventions,
MoF-intt−2, is constructed as the sum of all daily intervention operations during the month, where each inter-
vention amount in Yen on day t is converted to U.S. dollars using the closing JPY/USD exchange rate on the
last trading day before intervention day. ret-sp500t−2 is the return on the S&P 500 index. For foreign private
net purchases, privt, the instruments are: ∆(12m)ecad,t−3, the 12-month depreciation of the CAD against the
USD; ∆(3m)eeur,t−2, the 3-month depreciation of the USD against the EUR; ∆(12m)ejpy,t−6, the 12-month
depreciation of the JPY against the USD; ∆(9m)egbp,t−6, the 9-month depreciation of the USD against the
GBP. Both net purchases series are normalized by the total amount outstanding of treasury notes and bonds.
The sample is monthly from May1994 to December2007 for the dependent variables. In the columns labeled
“t-stats”, nw and hh denote test statistics constructed using Newey and West (1987) HAC and Hansen and
Hodrick (1980) AC standard errors, with lag order 14 for regressions of oﬃcial net purchases, and 1 for private
net purchases. The 90, 95 and 99 percent critical values for the F distribution with (5,158) degrees of freedom
are 1.88, 2.27 and 3.14, respectively.
t-stat
Regressors estimate ols nw hh
Panel A: foreign oﬃcial ﬂows: foit
constant 0.179 3.574 4.336 3.047
govt-relatedt−3 -0.270 -3.061 -4.412 -2.754
bund-spread
(5−10)
t−1 -0.302 -3.432 -3.323 -2.880
bund-spread
(10+)
t−1 0.500 4.366 3.139 3.699
MoF-intt−2 0.010 4.445 4.182 4.142
ret-sp500t−2 0.145 3.423 3.903 3.415
F-stat 16.294 16.173 12.444
adjR2 0.319
Panel B: foreign private ﬂows: privt
constant 0.261 7.148 8.198 7.259
∆(12m)ecad,t−3 -2.375 -3.966 -3.662 -4.028
∆(3m)eeur,t−2 0.568 2.952 3.158 2.998
∆(12m)ejpy,t−6 1.223 3.601 4.286 3.657
∆(9m)egbp,t−6 1.669 3.352 3.838 3.404
F-stat 13.728 14.382 14.160
adjR2 0.238
30Table 7: Excess returns and instrumented net purchases: baseline results.
This table presents parameter estimates of forecasting regressions of one-year ahead excess returns on lagged
variables. The dependent variable, rx
(n)
t+1 is the realized excess return on an n-year bond, with the speciﬁc
maturity indicated in column 1. In constructing all excess returns and factors, returns for the 2 to 5 year
maturity range are from the Fama-Bliss dataset, while those of the 6 to 10 year maturity range are from the
Gurkaynak et al. (2006) dataset. The construction of the control variables cp9407t, ln9407t and ^ gsw9407t is
explained in Table 3. c foit, instrumented foreign oﬃcial net purchases, is the ﬁtted value in a regression of foit
on lagged values of instruments and corresponds to the ﬁtted value of the regression in Panel A of Table 6.
d privt, instrumented foreign private net purchases, is the ﬁtted value in a regression of privt on lagged values of
instruments and corresponds to the ﬁtted value of the regression in Panel B of Table 6. Data is sampled at a
monthly frequency. Hansen and Hodrick (1980) AC t-statistics of lag order 12 are in parentheses. Coeﬃcient
estimates that are signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level or better are highlighted in boldface.
constant ln9407t cp9407t ^ gsw9407t c foi
2
t d privt adjR2 χ2
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) F
Fama-Bliss 2-5yr mat. bonds
rx
(2)
fb,t+1 -0.004 0.308 0.437 0.195 -0.028 0.005 0.685 621.814
(-1.380) (3.484) (4.674) (5.832) (-2.898) (1.004) 124.363
rx
(3)
fb,t+1 -0.009 0.489 0.892 0.402 -0.061 0.017 0.692 501.696
(-1.589) (2.996) (5.228) (6.605) (-3.379) (1.932) 100.339
rx
(4)
fb,t+1 -0.013 0.534 1.260 0.577 -0.083 0.031 0.677 394.205
(-1.696) (2.402) (5.369) (6.890) (-3.351) (2.570) 78.841
rx
(5)
fb,t+1 -0.018 0.458 1.610 0.770 -0.094 0.045 0.676 348.336
(-1.901) (1.691) (5.600) (7.521) (-3.107) (3.072) 69.667
Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright 6-10yr mat. bonds
rx
(6)
gsw,t+1 -0.020 0.351 1.970 0.884 -0.100 0.055 0.654 273.469
(-1.737) (1.088) (5.697) (7.165) (-2.749) (3.128) 54.694
rx
(7)
gsw,t+1 -0.021 0.195 2.278 1.001 -0.099 0.064 0.634 238.689
(-1.615) (0.528) (5.697) (7.001) (-2.378) (3.178) 47.738
rx
(8)
gsw,t+1 -0.022 0.010 2.560 1.099 -0.095 0.072 0.610 214.938
(-1.469) (0.024) (5.623) (6.741) (-2.011) (3.142) 42.988
rx
(9)
gsw,t+1 -0.022 -0.194 2.818 1.181 -0.089 0.079 0.583 194.534
(-1.313) (-0.413) (5.492) (6.419) (-1.675) (3.055) 38.907
rx
(10)
gsw,t+1 -0.021 -0.411 3.055 1.250 -0.082 0.084 0.555 175.273
(-1.162) (-0.783) (5.329) (6.072) (-1.383) (2.945) 35.055
31Table 8: Excess returns and instrumented net purchases: alternative speciﬁcations
This table presents parameter estimates of forecasting regressions of one-year ahead excess returns on lagged
variables. It includes alternative speciﬁcations to the main results on Table 7. The variables employed and
their construction are explained in that table. Data is sampled at a monthly frequency, with explanatory
variables measured during the period May1994-December2007, and excess returns (dependent variables) during
the May1995-December2008 period. Hansen and Hodrick (1980) AC t-statistics of lag order 12 are in parentheses.
Coeﬃcient estimates that are signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level or better are highlighted in boldface.





(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) F
Fama-Bliss 2-5yr mat. bonds
-0.003 0.278 0.434 0.191 -0.014 0.005 0.675 444.947
rx
(2)
fb,t+1 (-0.988) (3.009) (4.538) (5.518) (-2.223) (1.025) 88.989
-0.003 0.311 0.422 0.190 -0.028 0.005 0.682 537.217
(-1.205) (3.442) (4.573) (5.647) (-2.833) (0.783) 107.443
-0.007 0.426 0.886 0.393 -0.030 0.017 0.677 480.581
rx
(3)
fb,t+1 (-1.118) (2.450) (4.958) (6.114) (-2.467) (1.870) 96.116
-0.006 0.499 0.838 0.385 -0.061 0.017 0.681 459.708
(-1.068) (2.890) (4.785) (6.082) (-3.174) (1.395) 91.942
-0.011 0.467 1.243 0.568 -0.036 0.030 0.653 333.162
rx
(4)
fb,t+1 (-1.234) (1.916) (4.941) (6.280) (-2.103) (2.312) 66.632
-0.007 0.553 1.162 0.544 -0.082 0.031 0.656 324.420
(-0.940) (2.270) (4.689) (6.092) (-3.048) (1.805) 64.884
-0.016 0.398 1.583 0.763 -0.036 0.043 0.652 302.160
rx
(5)
fb,t+1 (-1.460) (1.330) (5.110) (6.861) (-1.742) (2.693) 60.432
-0.010 0.484 1.480 0.722 -0.095 0.047 0.652 250.968
(-1.030) (1.604) (4.804) (6.520) (-2.827) (2.246) 50.194
GSW 6-10yr mat. bonds
-0.018 0.300 1.935 0.880 -0.035 0.052 0.631 243.781
rx
(6)
gsw,t+1 (-1.378) (0.848) (5.235) (6.615) (-1.416) (2.728) 48.756
-0.009 0.383 1.802 0.827 -0.099 0.056 0.625 186.940
(-0.798) (1.052) (4.832) (6.140) (-2.441) (2.192) 37.388
-0.019 0.163 2.234 1.000 -0.030 0.060 0.613 217.823
rx
(7)
gsw,t+1 (-1.338) (0.405) (5.273) (6.549) (-1.065) (2.758) 43.565
-0.009 0.233 2.080 0.933 -0.098 0.064 0.602 150.834
(-0.647) (0.555) (4.816) (5.973) (-2.091) (2.204) 30.167
-0.021 0.001 2.508 1.103 -0.023 0.066 0.592 197.784
rx
(8)
gsw,t+1 (-1.275) (0.002) (5.250) (6.397) (-0.729) (2.721) 39.557
-0.008 0.053 2.336 1.023 -0.093 0.072 0.576 127.391
(-0.504) (0.111) (4.761) (5.753) (-1.757) (2.167) 25.478
-0.021 -0.179 2.758 1.190 -0.015 0.071 0.568 179.292
rx
(9)
gsw,t+1 (-1.196) (-0.358) (5.176) (6.179) (-0.425) (2.643) 35.858
-0.006 -0.148 2.572 1.099 -0.087 0.078 0.549 111.103
(-0.370) (-0.278) (4.675) (5.498) (-1.458) (2.103) 22.221
-0.022 -0.370 2.986 1.263 -0.006 0.076 0.544 160.567
rx
(10)
gsw,t+1 (-1.110) (-0.671) (5.065) (5.922) (-0.165) (2.546) 32.113
-0.005 -0.361 2.789 1.161 -0.079 0.083 0.521 99.090
(-0.251) (-0.611) (4.568) (5.227) (-1.202) (2.032) 19.818
32Table 9: Out-of-sample forecasts: Instrumented foreign net purchases
This table presents the results of out-of-sample forecast comparisons of nested regression models for excess
bond returns. The dependent variable is the n-period excess bond return. The forecasting variables, for each
bilateral comparison, are indicated in column(4). The vector xt contains the control variables and is deﬁned as:
xt = (1,cp9407t,ln9407t, ^ gsw9407t). The vector yt contains the additional forecasting variables and is deﬁned
as: yt = (c foi
2
t, d privt). All variables are deﬁned in Table 7. MSEu is the mean-squared error of the unrestricted
model that includes yt as additional regressors; MSEr is the mean-squared error of the restricted model that
excludes yt, and hence is equivalent to the restriction that the estimated coeﬃcient on yt is zero. In column (5)
a number less than one means that the unrestricted model has lower mean-squared forecasting error. “enc-new”
is the statistic for the test of encompassing in Clark and McCracken (2001); the null hypothesis is that the
restricted model encompasses the unrestricted model with additional regressors. The 99% asymptotic critical




Dependent estimation Forecast asympt.
variable period sample Comparison MSEu/MSEr Statistic CV
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fama-Bliss 2-5yr mat. bonds
rx
(2)
fb,t+1 1994:05-2002:08 (100 obs) 2004:08-2008:12 (53 obs) yt + xt vs. xt 0.8273 9.5920 2.89
rx
(3)
fb,t+1 1994:05-2002:08 (100 obs) 2004:08-2008:12 (53 obs) yt + xt vs. xt 0.8113 12.0021 2.89
rx
(4)
fb,t+1 1994:05-2002:08 (100 obs) 2004:08-2008:12 (53 obs) yt + xt vs. xt 0.8010 12.6208 2.89
rx
(5)
fb,t+1 1994:05-2002:08 (100 obs) 2004:08-2008:12 (53 obs) yt + xt vs. xt 0.7604 15.6165 2.89
Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright 6-10yr mat. bonds
rx
(6)
gsw,t+1 1994:05-2002:08 (100 obs) 2004:08-2008:12 (53 obs) yt + xt vs. xt 0.7643 16.6391 2.89
rx
(7)
gsw,t+1 1994:05-2002:08 (100 obs) 2004:08-2008:12 (53 obs) yt + xt vs. xt 0.7631 17.9168 2.89
rx
(8)
gsw,t+1 1994:05-2002:08 (100 obs) 2004:08-2008:12 (53 obs) yt + xt vs. xt 0.7723 18.4204 2.89
rx
(9)
gsw,t+1 1994:05-2002:08 (100 obs) 2004:08-2008:12 (53 obs) yt + xt vs. xt 0.7905 18.0904 2.89
rx
(10)
gsw,t+1 1994:05-2002:08 (100 obs) 2004:08-2008:12 (53 obs) yt + xt vs. xt 0.8124 17.2151 2.89
33Table 10: Correlation between components of holdings and yield changes
This table presents correlation coeﬃcients for lags k = 0,1,2 of changes in the 10-year treasury yield ∆y
(10)
t with
components of adjusted foreign holdings of long-term U.S. Treasury series, as deﬁned in equation (6) in the text.
The holdings series and its components are from Bertaut and Tryon (2007), and are normalized by quarterly





xt k = −3 k = −2 k = −1 k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
∆y
(10)
t 0.015 -0.092 0.311 1 0.311 -0.092 0.015
∆ˆ St -0.027 -0.017 -0.095 -0.412 -0.269 0.085 0.006
valt -0.041 0.079 0.012 -0.612 -0.552 0.029 0.059
gapt -0.022 0.002 -0.008 0.053 0.015 0.006 -0.053
ﬂowt 0.030 -0.064 -0.096 0.039 0.156 0.103 -0.009
34